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WVASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
DUPLICATION OF DAMAGES: INVASION
OF PRIVACY AND DEFAMATION
Defendant mayor of Medical Lake, Washington, exhibited to at
least one person what appeared to be police photographs of the plain-
tiff, together with what appeared to be an "F.B.I. record" on him.
Neither the photographs nor the "F.B.I. record" were what they
appeared to be, but defendant indicated they represented criminal
convictions of plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit for defamation and
invasion of privacy, and a jury returned favorable verdicts on both
counts. However, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the invasion of privacy count.
Plaintiff appealed, contending right of privacy should be recognized
in Washington and damages should be allowed on both counts. Held:
Damages could not be recovered for both defamation and invasion of
privacy, as to do so would permit double recovery for identical
elements of damage resulting from a single tortious act. Brink v.
Griffith, 65 Wn. 2d 253, 396 P.2d 793 (1964).
The Washington Supreme Court has avoided recognizing right of
privacy in a series of opinions spanning more than fifty years.' How-
ever, many injuries compensable in other jurisdictions in an action
for invasion of privacy are compensable in Washington in an action
for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress. In jurisdic-
tions recognizing right of privacy, defamation and invasion of privacy
are commonly alleged as separate counts in one suit.2 Until the
principal case, however, no court had considered the question of dupli-
cation of damages when a plaintiff recovered for both counts.'
The court in the principal case noted that, although damages are
'Almy v. Kvanune, 63 Wn. 2d 326, 387 P.2d 372 (1963) (any right of privacy had
been waived by plaintiff); Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wn.
2d 267, 117 P.2d 896 (1947) (if right of privacy existed in Washington, defendant's
conduct did not constitute an invasion); State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131
Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924) (court enjoined unauthorized use of a presidential
candidate's name without mentioning right of privacy); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86
Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122 (1915) (if right of privacy existed, it had not been in-
vaded) ; Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911) (court
alligned itself with jurisdictions denying right of privacy, notably New York in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)).
'E.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Linehan
v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P2d 326 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ; Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (first case allowing
recovery for invasion of privacy).
'But see Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913) (dictum),
stating that it would be difficult to avoid duplication of damages if plaintiffs were
allowed to bring one action for libel and another for invasion of privacy; no men-
tion of one action consisting of two self-sustaining counts.
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awarded primarily for loss of reputation in a defamation action, a
plaintiff is also entitled to recover for mental distress. Conversely,
although damages are awarded primarily for mental distress in an
invasion of privacy action, damages may be recovered for loss of
reputation. Since the trial court's instructions permitted general dam-
ages on both counts, and the jury awarded damages for each, the court
reasoned that each element had been twice compensated. By dis-
posing of the appeal on the issue of duplication of damages, the
court again avoided recognizing a right of privacy in Washington.
The court in the principal case quoted Dean Wade's solution to
the problem of duplication of damages when both defamation and
invasion of privacy are alleged: "A better position is taken by the
New York cases which indicate that there is only a single action for
the one transaction [tortious conduct] with complete damages being
given for it."4 Wade apparently meant that, when actions lie for both
defamation and invasion of privacy, only one of the two should be
allowed. Presuming this to be the court's interpretation, the principal
case appears to hold incorrectly that defamation and invasion of
privacy may not be maintained concurrently under any circumstances.
Neither logic nor the New York cases cited by Wade support the
ostensible meaning of the quotation. Although the New York cases
declare that a plaintiff whose privacy is invaded and who is simultan-
eously defamed has only one "action," they manifestly refer to the
doctrine of res judicata, requiring plaintiff to recover all damages in
one suit or be barred from further redress.' As general damages for
either defamation or invasion of privacy may include the elements
of damage of both, it is possible that the concurrent maintenance of
both actions in one suit will result in duplicated damages. Affirming
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the principal case, on the
invasion of privacy count, was consonant with Wade's conclusion
that defamation and invasion of privacy should not lie concurrently.
But duplication may be avoided by allocating, in the jury instructions,
specific elements of damage to specific counts, as well as by limiting
the plaintiff to one of two possible counts. No allocation was attempted
in the principal case, indicating a possible duplication of damages and
'65 Wn. 2d at 259, 396 P.2d at 797, quoting Wade, Defamation And The Right
Of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1124 (1962).
'Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
Dicta in Russell, supra, indicating that defamation and invasion of privacy will
not lie concurrently, are belied by the court's decision that plaintiff could commingle
claims for defamation and invasion of privacy.
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a correct disposition by the appellate court.' If two distinct legal
injuries have been inflicted, both should be compensated.7 The holding
in the principal case should be limited to instances in which elements
of damage are not allocated.
Invasion of privacy encompasses four separable categories of tor-
tious conduct: placing one in a false light in the public eye, intruding
into one's private affairs, publicly disclosing embarrassing private
facts, and appropriating one's name or likeness.8 A majority of the
fact patterns of privacy cases are within principles established in
Washington in actions for defamation and intentional infliction of
mental distress. Although the principles are applicable, few Washing-
ton defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress cases
duplicate invasion of privacy fact patterns. Therefore, a plaintiff in
Washington choosing to allege defamation or intentional infliction of
mental distress may have to argue by analogy. If plaintiff chooses
to allege invasion of privacy, a favorable verdict at the trial level
is certain to be appealed; on appeal, he must overcome the court's
reluctance to accept privacy. It is possible to allege invasion of
privacy together with defamation or intentional infliction of mental
distress, but plaintiff's risks are multiplied. Not only will a favor-
'While the trial court's instructions would have permitted the jury to duplicate
damages, whether or not they did is conjectural.
'In Bennett v. Norbon, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476, 479 (1959), the court allocated
the number of actions to be brought in accord with the number of injuries suffered,
rather than in accord with the number of defendant's overt acts:
Often no other remedy exists, but if one is concurrent it does not obliterate
the right of privacy. If a modest young girl should be set upon by a dozen
ruffians who did not touch her but by threats compelled her to undress, give them
her clothes, and flee naked through the streets, it could not be doubted that her
right of privacy had been invaded as well as her clothes stolen.
'Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Sundry fact patterns within
these four categories are covered in an increasing number of privacy cases from
other jurisdictions. The court characterized the principal case as a false light case,
65 Wn. 2d at 258, 396 P.2d at 797. Significantly, the characterization was made after
independent research by the court. Neither party attempted categorization. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 8-14; Brief for Appellee, pp. 20, 21.
In Almy v. Kvamme, 63 Wn. 2d 326, 387 P.2d 372 (1963), the court noted that the
alleged invasion of privacy involved disclosure of private affairs. Relying upon the
court's willingness to classify privacy cases, a plaintiff may concentrate upon advo-
cating one of the four privacy categories. By thus limiting the issue, plaintiff should
be able to present a more concise argument than has been feasible in former advo-
cacies of privacy. See cases cited Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950) ; Annot., 168 A.L.R.
446 (1947) ; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
Since the birth of right of privacy in Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890), development has been spurred by a wealth of favorable
law review articles. E.g., Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" In 48 Pieces Vs. Uniform
Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REv. 734 (1948); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39
MicH. L. Rxv. 526 (1941); Yanklwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NovaE DAME LAW.,




able privacy verdict be appealed, but interpretation of the principal
case consonant with Wade's conclusion will have to be avoided.
Even if damages were allocated between counts, a refusal by the
supreme court to accept right of privacy, or misinterpretation of the
principal case, could cost the plaintiff damages previously awarded
him. Consequently, in evaluating his choices of action, plaintiff must
be cognizant of the possibility of maintaining an action for defamation
or intentional infliction of mental distress as an alternative to any
specific privacy category.
A "false light" invasion of privacy consists of publicly casting the
plaintiff in a false image. Publications in the "false light" category
need not be defamatory,' but they usually are.' ° In Washington,
defamation extends to a publication which "exposes a person to hatred,
contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or deprives him of public confidence
or social intercourse,"" or which tends to "injure him in his standing
in his profession."' 2 This liberal definition of defamation includes the
majority of cases within the "false light" category. The principal case
presents a typical "false light" fact pattern; exhibiting the photographs
and "F.B.I. record" simultaneously defamed Brink and evoked a false
image of him.' 3 A "false light" action in jurisdictions recognizing
right of privacy has the advantage of avoiding defamation distinctions
between libel and slander, per se and per quod, and publications
actionable with and without proof of special damages.' 4 Recent Wash-
' Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (picture of in-
jured child published with article on pedestrian carelessness when child was not
shown to have been careless; held not defamatory, but an invasion of privacy).
"J Prosser, supra note 8, at 400. See cases cited Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950);
Annot., 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947) ; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
' Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., 54 Wn. 2d 743, 752, 344 P.2d 705, 711 (1959). Accord,
RESTATEMSENT, TORTS § 559, comment b (1938): "A communication is defamatory
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
"Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., supra note 11, at 754, 344 P.2d at 712. Accord, R-STATE-
MENT, TORTs § 559, comment b (1938): defamation "may consist of imputations which,
while not affecting another's personal reputation, tend to discredit his financial standing
in the community."
raThe defamation count was successful in the principal case. In addition, the
court noted that "the import of defendant's conduct was to cast the plaintiff in a false
light." 65 Wn. 2d at 258, 396 P.2d at 797.
" Libel is defined at common law as defamation through written publication, and
slander as defamation through spoken publication. Averments vary according to
classification of a publication as libelous or slanderous, which is troublesome in the
radio, television, and movie cases. Wyse, The Complaint Iu Libel And Slander:
A Dilemma For Plaintiff, 33 CEl.- KnENT L. REv. 313, 314 (1955). See Remington v.
Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (publication by panelist on television as
slander); Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544
(1934) (publication by movie as libel). With few exceptions, slander is not action-
able without proof of special damages. The exceptions are classified as slander per
se. Libel per quod also requires proof of special damages, while libel per se does
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ington decisions, however, indicate that these distinctions are no longer
significant.' 5 Therefore, in those "false light" cases for which an
action for defamation could be maintained, plaintiff is not prejudiced
by the unavailability of a right of privacy action in Washington.
A second category of right of privacy cases focuses on intrusion.
Recovery has been allowed for physical intrusions, such as breaking
into plaintiff's house,' 6 and more subtle intrusions such as eavesdrop-
ping, 7 shadowing,' and unauthorized examination of private papers.'
If remedy is sought in Washington for the more subtle intrusions, an
action for intentional infliction of mental distress is often appropriate.
Until recently, liability for intentional infliction of mental distress
depended entirely upon whether or not defendant's conduct could be
characterized as "wrongful."20 This test has been interpreted as re-
quiring that defendant's actions be "outrageous and contrary to public
standards of acceptable conduct."'" In Christensen v. Swedish Hos-
pital,2" the court approved an additional form of intentional infliction
of mental distress, holding that a usually acceptable act (effort to
collect a just debt) is tortious if defendant's sole motive is to cause
the plaintiff mental distress. Apparently, liability may now be estab-
lished under either the wrongful conduct or motive test. The resulting
inclusiveness of intentional infliction of mental distress in Washington
not. But the courts have not been able to agree upon a definition for libel per se;
some hold that it is any libel sufficiently serious that injury may be inferred, while
others hold that it is any libel susceptible of proof without resort to extrinsic
facts. See POLLOCK, TORTS 177-202 (14th ed. 1939). Other complexities peculiar to
defamation include averments of inducement (statement of extrinsic facts to establish
the defamatory tendencies of an otherwise equivocal publication), colloquium (aver-
ment connecting plaintiff, extrinsic facts, and publication), and innuendo (averment
of publication's meaning). See People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925).
'Any remaining distinction between libel and slander appears to have been
abolished in Grein v. LaPoma, 54 Wn. 2d 844, 340 P.2d 766 (1959), 33 So. CAL.
L. REv. 104, 11 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 119, 35 WASH. L. REV. 253 (1960). In Grein, the
court held that, unless a publication is utterly incapable of defamatory meaning,
whether or not it is libel per se is a question for the jury. Sending the issue to the
jury and defining libel per se as the equivalent of defamation obviate the need for
proof of special damages.
"MFord Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 132 S.E.2d 206 (1963).
" La Crone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N.E2d 15 (1961).
" Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119 (1963).
"Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (dictum); Brex v. Smith, 104
N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929).
Gadburv v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925).
Note, 38 WASH. L. REv. 360, 366 (1963). See Browning v. Slenderella Systems,
54 Wn. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), 35 WASH. L. Rav. 245 (1960) (act of racial
discrimination wrongful by nature) ; Gadbury v. Blietz, supra note 20 (holding body
of plaintiff's son as security for the obligation of a third person) ; Davis v. Tacoma
Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904) (directing plaintiff to leave
amusement park under mistaken impression that she was a prostitute).
=59 Wn. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897 (1962), 38 WASH. L. Rav. 360 (1963).
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appears to provide an adequate remedy for the more subtle invasions
of privacy by intrusion.
The majority of right of privacy cases fall within the third category,
appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's advan-
tage.23 Cases include the use of another's name in advertising,24 as
a contestant in a popularity contest,25 and as signatory to a telegram
sent to the governor of Oregon.26 The only Washington case consid-
ering unauthorized use of another's name is State ex rel. LaFollette
v. Hinkle, 7 in which the court enjoined use of a presidential candi-
date's name by the self-styled "LaFollette State Party." LaFollette
establishes the principle that one is entitled to govern the use of his
name, and indicates that unauthorized appropriation is actionable in
Washington.28 In order to provide a remedy in tort commensurate
with invasion of privacy by appropriation, the holding in LaFollette
must be extended to permit compensation in damages as well as
enjoinder, and include appropriation by means of photographs and
word portraits. These extensions should be readily achieved on the
basis of LaFollette.
The fourth category, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,
involves publicizing the truth. The truthfulness of publications within
this category distinguishes them from those within the "false light"
category, and operates as the defense of truth in a defamation action.
Public disclosure cases have been limited to "relatively extreme"
situations,29 such as a movie about the unsavory life of a reformed
prostitute,30 extensive publicizing of overdue debts,3 and public enum-
eration of a woman's embarrassing masculine characteristics.32 Aside
' Prosser, supra note 8, at 401. See cases cited Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950);
Annot., 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947) ; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
"Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich- 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y. Supp. 908 (Super. Ct. 1893).
.
3Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924). La Follette has been inaccurately discussed
as a privacy case. Annot, 138 A.L.R. 22, 27 (1942) ; Prosser, supra note 8, at 388
n,50. Sitting as a court of original jurisdiction, the Washington Supreme Court
decided La Follette within three days of hearing. Neither court nor counsel men-
tioned right of privacy. The decision appears to rest upon an implied property
interest in one's name, rather than the right to avoid publicity upon which invasion
of privacy by appropriation rests.
' Cf. Brillhardt v. Ben Tipp, Inc., 48 Wn. 2d 722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956), which
protects a property interest in plaintiff's telephone number.
Note, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 357, 358 (1962).
' Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
"Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941) ; Brents v.
Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).




from a few statutory provisions,33 the only apparent remedy in Wash-
ington for this type of invasion is an action alleging intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress. Public disclosure cases require that the facts
revealed be formerly private,84 and that defendant publicize rather
than simply disclose.3 5 In effect, these two requirements limit public
disclosure liability to defendant's intentional acts, and make the
remedy of intentional infliction of mental distress particularly appro-
priate in Washington. Cases involving publicity of the plaintiff's
debts may be actionable under the wrongful motive test established
in Christensen v. Swedish Hospital.3 6 But the usual public disclosure
case is brought against a news medium whose motive is increasing
circulation rather than exposing plaintiff.Y The absence of a plaintiff-
directed motive will usually leave only the wrongful conduct form of
intentional infliction of mental distress. Dean Prosser's synthesis of
right of privacy cases involving public disclosure, however, reveals
a test whereby there will be liability only for disclosures "which the
customs and ordinary views of the community will not tolerate.""
Liability under this test would seem commensurate with liability under
the wrongful conduct test in Washington.
Thus, principles established in the actions of defamation and in-
tentional infliction of mental distress provide a basis upon which
injuries within the four privacy categories may be redressed in Wash-
ington without accepting right of privacy. Possibly only right of
privacy will suffice to redress subtle intrusions and disclosure of true
but embarrassing facts by news media when neither defendant's con-
duct nor motive is sufficiently objectionable to sustain an action for
intentional infliction of mental distress. But the majority of privacy
cases require a finding of defendant's misconduct closely analogous
'Several Washington statutes make disclosure of private communications a
criminal offense. WAsH. Ray. CODE §§ 9.73.020 (1956) (telegrams and sealed letters) ;
74.04.060 (1959) (public assistance recipient's records). These statutes may provide
a basis for tort actions to redress any injury arising out of their violation, as the
violation of a statute is a legal wrong. A legal wrong coupled with damage will
sustain a tort action. Christensen v. Swedish Hospital, 59 Wn. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897(1962), 38 WAsH. L. REv. 360 (1963).
' Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, 21 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 1945) ; Prosser,
supra note 8, at 394.
"Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 798 (1948) ; Lewis v. Physicians
& Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wn. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947) (without holding that
right of privacy existed in Washington, the court held that disclosure of overdue
debts not amounting to publicity was not actionable as an invasion of privacy).
a 59 Wn. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897 (1962), 38 WASH. L. REV. 360 (1963).
'E.g., Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Griffin v. Medical Society, 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct 1939) (medicaljournal).
' Prosser, supra note 8, at 397.
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to the findings required in Washington cases of defamation and in-
tentional infliction of mental distress.
Present confusion in the right of privacy field is largely attributable
to judicial acceptance of the doctrine as though it composed a unit
rather than four distinct categories. In light of the variety of interests
protected, meaningful precedent can only be established by determin-
ing which categories are desirable, on the basis of cases presenting
fact patterns applicable to the category under consideration. The
Washington Supreme Court, indicating in the principal case that each
category may be considered separately, appears to be following the
most rational approach to a consideration of privacy.
